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Outline
The general public and the media have had fun fantasising about 
the motives and interests that push migrants to embark on 
dangerous journeys across the sea. Smuggling is often understood 
through a simplification of both the clandestine traveller and the 
smuggler: a process of abstraction that overlooks any ambiguities 
and nuances. While researchers have abundantly studied the 
profile of the migrant, they had been less interested in the other 
key actor of the clandestine migration: the smuggler. Who is the 
smuggler? How does s/he operate? Why do migrants place their 
lives in the smuggler’s hands? The goal of this paper is to attend 
to the complexity of the phenomenon by looking at human 
smuggling across the Adriatic Sea. In light of the need to elaborate 
an adequate policy response to this phenomenon, a better 
understanding of smuggling is pivotal in ensuring the security of 
the receiving state and that of the migrant. With this task in mind, 
this paper problematizes the figure of the smugglers beyond overly 
simplistic generalizations and representations. In so doing, this 
paper argues that a truly effective answer to human smuggling 
would require the EU and its state members to concentrate on 
reducing “demand” rather than curbing “supply.”
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Introduction
Ahmad is an Iraqi Kurd in his late twenties. He 
arrived in Italy in 2011, and has lived there ever 
since. He is an asylum seeker who have survived 
the perilous journey across the Middle East and 
Southern Europe. He began his journey when he 
was thirteen years old. Originally from Kurdish 
Iraq, he left the country along with his family 
after the disappearance of his father, abducted by 
the Iraqi secret service for his political militancy 
in a Kurdish party. Ahmad and his family went to 
Syria where they applied for refugee status; they 
never received an answer and, few years after, they 
came to despair of an answer ever coming. Ahmad 
spent his entire adolescence in Damascus where he 
studied and worked. However, fearing persecution 
for his membership to a youth social group, he fled 
the country. Upon the payment of 1500 euros, a 
smuggling network operating across the area helped 
him to cross Turkey and arrive in Greece. Here, 
he ran out of money. Determined to reach Italy at 
any cost, he tried countless times to hide in one of 
the many commercial trucks that load into a ferry 
heading to Italy. A couple of times, he even made it 
to an Italian port, but Italian port authorities sent 
him back. After a whole year of failures, Ahmad’s 
relatives helped him to get together 2000 euros 
to pay another group of smugglers for a passage 
on a fishing boat. The Guardia di Finanza (Italian 
Customs/Tax and Excise armed force) intercepted 
the boat in open waters but this time they did not 
send him back. He applied for political asylum upon 
his arrival; one year after its application, Ahmad was 
finally recognized as a political refugee.
It took Ahmad over a year to arrive in Italy. During 
his journey, he took cars and boats, hid inside 
and underneath trucks, and walked. He was also 
arrested and often lived rough. Yet, Ahmad’s story 
is a story of success: he is one of the few who made 
it to Italy. He is grateful to his smugglers for that: “if 
I am in Italy now”, he once told me, “it is clearly not 
thanks to Italian democracy, but it is for them [the 
smugglers]”. Of course, many others have not had 
the same fortune. The Mediterranean is the deadliest 
route to Europe. Even though the number of people 
seeking refuge in Europe is much smaller than the 
overall number of undocumented migrants arriving 
in Italy, 1this sea route is extraordinarily dangerous. 
This has perhaps never been truer than today. The 
escalation of the Syrian conflict and the political 
instability in Iraq dramatically lifted the number of 
clandestine arrivals in the southern coastal areas of 
Italy during 2014 and early months of 2015. A radical 
increase in the number of deaths has accompanied 
the mounting number of clandestine migrants. 
Since 1988, around 19,000 of these migrants lost 
their lives in the Mediterranean. The biggest spikes 
have been in the last two years: indeed, already in 
the first four months of 2015, about 1800 people 
died in their attempt to reach Europe. To this figure, 
we must add the number, presumably very high, of 
those who died but whose bodies never turned up.2 
1 In fact, the largest influx of migrants in Europe takes place via the continental European Union and happens 
through the abuse of visa conditions. See Sciortino, G. 2004, “Between phantoms and necessary evils: some critical points in 
the study of irregular migration”, IMIS Beitrage, 24: 17-44.
2 Fargues, P. Di Bartolomeo, A. 2015, “Drowned Europe”, Migration Policy Centre, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/35557/MPC_2015_05_PB.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed: 25 May 2015].
3 ■  The smuggler: hero or felon?
Ahmad’s defence of the smuggler clearly reflects a 
part of the whole story. Still, his account summarizes 
the complexity of these journeys and their main 
actors. Irregular immigration has produced 
political heat across the world. Dramatic photos of 
migrants crammed into wretched boats circulates 
in the media. These images accompany journalistic 
accounts that tell stories of poor and desperate 
individuals who are deceived by organized crime 
cartels. All this has persuaded political leaders and 
authorities to conceive clandestine migration as 
a war, a war where the evil is represented by the 
smugglers. But who are the smugglers? And how do 
they operate? What convinces migrants to put their 
lives in the smugglers’ hands? In Italian popular and 
political discourse, the answer to these questions is 
straightforward: the smugglers – usually identified 
as the scafisti (boatmen) – are the immoral and 
deceitful villains who do not hesitate to toss human 
beings in the sea or sabotage their own vessels in 
order to force authorities to carry out rescues. In 
this view, the integrity of European borders and 
the safety of migrants would thus be ensured by 
the militarization of borders and the consequent 
eradication of smuggling networks. This paper was 
written to problematize this narrative. 
This paper moves under the assumption that 
smuggling is a complex social and economic 
phenomenon. Studies and my own fieldwork in 
Apulia – in south-eastern  Italy – and Greece show 
how the smuggler is a multifaceted figure. The 
demonization of this actor is part and parcel of 
the gradual simplification of both the clandestine 
traveller and the smuggler: a process of abstraction 
that overlooks important ambiguities and nuances. 
This is neither to neglect the plight of the former, 
nor the cruelty of the latter: the suffering and 
hardships that many migrants endure  cannot be 
stressed enough. It is precisely for this, however, that 
we urgently need a more nuanced understanding 
of smuggling and the actors involved. This aim 
acquires greater significance within the broader 
goal of reinforcing EU member states’ control over 
their borders and ensuring migrants’ safety. With 
this task in mind, this paper will first look at the 
complexity of the phenomenon by looking at the 
evolution of human smuggling from various points 
of departures to Apulia. It will then problematize 
the popular image of the smugglers beyond 
simplistic and popular representations. In so doing, 
this paper will conclude by demonstrating that the 
control of migration and the safety of migrants are 
not at odds with one another. However, this twofold 
goal requires a response other than the mere 
militarization of border.
Human smuggling across the Adriatic Sea
Smugglers channel migrant streams to Europe across 
three major sea routes. The Western Mediterranean 
via Morocco and Spain, for sub Saharan irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers until the late-2000s. 
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Over the past five years, their number decreased 
significantly. The second is the central route, which 
is based out of Libya and travels across to the Italian 
and Maltese costs. This route has registered a peak 
of arrival over the last 15 years. The third pathway 
is the eastern Mediterranean route through Turkey 
and Greece; it remains a popular route for African 
and Asian labour migrants and refugees wishing 
to access Europe via Italy. The Italian Ministry of 
Interior states that between 1 January 1999 and 31 
August 2014 almost half a million migrants were 
smug-gled to Italian shores.3 In the third quarter 
of 2014, the EU agency Frontex reported how 
detections of clandestine migrants in Italy account 
for more than two thirds of the total number 
of apprehended migrants – an increase of over 
300% compared to 2013.4 Sea crossings take place 
predominantly on board wooden and fiber-glass 
boats, rubber dinghies, fishing boats, and big cargo 
ships.
It is often said that smuggling groups are highly 
sophisticated and hierarchical criminal cartels; 
that they run a multibillionaire business; and that 
this criminal ring runs alongside a number of 
different illegal trades – most notably drug, human, 
weapon, and cigarette trafficking. I collected 
evidence concerning organizations involved in 
human smuggling from the early 1990s until 2015 
in Apulia. My field research has not revealed highly 
centralized and powerful smuggling organizations.5 
The Italian administrative region of Apulia faces 
Albania and Greece, and Montenegro across the 
sea. From 1991 to 2001, it became one of the most 
travelled points of entry for migrants – originally 
Albanians – who fled economic and political distress: 
between 150,000 and 250,000 people crossed the 
channel of Otranto on their way to Italy and other 
European countries.6  Crossing the Bay of Valona to 
the area between Brindisi and Otranto is the shortest 
way to reach the Apulian coast from Albania: 40 
miles wide at its narrowest point. The first groups 
of smugglers formed in 1991, soon after the Italian 
government began expelling Albanian emigrants.7 
These were predominantly Italian cigarette 
smugglers who entered into a joint venture with 
Albanian families from Valona. Italians provided 
the expertise, capital, and technology. Human 
smuggling was a way to diversify their business 
strategies and absorb risks. At this stage, Albanians 
managed only the recruitment of customers and 
their transport to the ports where migrants were 
embarked on boats piloted by Italians. However, 
the Albanians progressively marginalized their 
Italian associates and acquired control of the traffic. 
Already in the second half of the 1990s, Albanian 
smugglers possessed the organizational resources, 
the technical competences, and the capital to 
3 Fargues, P. Bonfanti, S. 2014,“When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives crossing the Medi-
terranean and what Europe is doing about it”, Migration Policy Centre, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33271/
MPC_PB_2014-05.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed: 25 May 2015].
4 FRONTEX, 2014. FRAN Quartlery, Quarter 3.
5 See also Pastore, F., Sciortino, G. & Monzini, P. 2006, “Schengen’s soft underbelly? Irregular migration and human 
smuggling across land and sea borders to Italy”, International Migration, 44(4): 95-119. 6 ICMPD (International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development), 2000. How to halt illegal migration to, from, and through South East Europe? A report on the 
activities of the Working Group on South East Europe of the Budapest Group, with proposals on further action in the overall 
framework of the Stability Pact. Prepared by the Secretariat of the Budapest Group for the Meeting of the Working Group in 
Skoplje on 27–28 November. 
7 See also Albahari, M. 2006, “Death and the Moral State: Making Borders and Sovereignty at the Southern Edges of 
Europe”, CCIS Working Paper 136, http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wp-content/uploads/WP_136.pdf [Accessed: 25 May 2015]; and Pas-
tore et al., “Schengen’s soft underbelly?”.
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run the business on their own. At the moment of 
maximum expansion, the network could smuggle 
an average of 200-250 people every night by means 
of 10-15 metre long rubber dinghies equipped with 
three or even four powerful outboard motors that 
could make up to two journeys a night, each lasting 
a couple of hours.
The Albanian route decreased steadily over the 
years and officially died out at the beginning of the 
2000s. The shrinking of the migratory flow across 
Albania and the stricter enforcement of law from 
local and Italian authorities seem to have a played 
a major role in the termination of the route. After a 
drop in the detection of illegal immigrants, the area 
recently re-gained its popularity as an important 
point of arrival. In 2014, Frontex reported a 
resurgence in detections of illegal border-crossings. 
Most detections are of secondary movements 
of Syrians, Afghans and other asylum seekers 
who arrived in Apulia by having already entered 
Europe via Greece.8 In this route, Italy is usually 
only another transit step toward migrants’ final 
destinations, such as Sweden, Germany, and France. 
The crossing is operated by different organizations 
that can be situated somewhere in the continuum 
between single-service providers and multi-service 
networks.9 The former are small groups that run 
the sea crossing. They often have solid roots in the 
local community and a deep knowledge of marine 
traffic. They do not have ties within the migrants’ 
countries of origin, and the recruitment happens 
through intermediary groups. The latter are larger 
and wide-ranging networks that have divisions in 
migrants’ country of origin. These organizations 
operate either land, air, or sea routes and provide 
customers with a variety of services that range from 
border crossing to release from detention centres. 
My fieldwork supports those studies that have 
demonstrated how smuggling groups involve a 
highly differentiated yet flexible structure whose roles 
– organizers, passeurs, looks-out, intermediaries, etc 
– are not integrated into rigid hierarchies and bound 
by long-term agreements. Smugglers simply cannot 
work on a long timescale.10 Conversely, they operate 
in a market with high competition and fast changing 
scenarios. The considerable instability of the market 
explains the heterogeneity of smuggling networks. 
Indeed, the smuggling network active in the Eastern 
Mediterranean corridor still consists of a system of 
flexible and independent – and largely family-based – 
organizations that have entered into partnerships with 
one another  for short periods. Furthermore, even though 
authorities have at times reported the overlapping of 
people smuggling with drug, arm, and human trafficking, 
information collected show how these groups do not run 
these different “enterprises”. There is even less evidence 
for mafia involvement in smuggling networks. 
8 FRONTEX, 2014. FRAN Quartlery, Quarter 2, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_
Q2_2014.pdf [Accessed: 25 May 2015].
9 Pastore et al., “Schengen’s soft underbelly?”.
10 See, for example, Pastore et al., “Schengen’s soft underbelly?”; Sanchez, G. 2015 (forthcoming), Human Smuggling 
and Border Crossings, New York, Routledge; and Triandafyllidou, A. and Maroukis, T. 2012, Migrant Smuggling. Irregular 
Migration from Asia and Africa to Europe, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
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The good and the evil: choosing the smuggler
Politicians, border authorities, and journalists usually 
portray the smuggler as a cruel and reckless criminal 
driven exclusively by profits. Smugglers, on the other 
hand, have a different perception of themselves. They 
represented themselves, in conversations I had with 
them, as service-providers who satisfy a need that people 
cannot satisfy through legal channels. They showed clear 
awareness that they were part of a highly unstable and 
dangerous market, the reason for which they asked high 
fees from their clients. They did not perceive their activities 
as being immoral. They actually claimed to operate a 
moral economy and privilege ethical choices over mere 
profit. Smugglers would thus prioritize the transport of 
their nationals, guarantee a full reimbursement or a free 
passage to the client if the first journey is unsuccessful, 
and carry some passengers – generally children, elderly 
and invalid – who cannot afford paying the full fee. 
Accounts about the callousness of smugglers are also 
often dismissed by migrants: those very people who risk 
their lives crossing the Mediterranean. So is the smuggler 
a saviour or a murderer? In truth, it is impossible 
to draw a homogenous profile of ‘the smuggler’. 
Nonetheless, empirical evidence challenges the image of 
a few criminal masterminds who control a network of 
hardened crooks devoted to the systematic enslavement 
of vulnerable migrants. What my findings suggest is that 
the relationship between smugglers and their costumers 
is far more complex than media and popular accounts 
would suggest.
First, smuggled people are not only victims of the 
smugglers. If the considerable heterogeneity of this 
category explains the complexity associated with the 
choice of the smuggler, the decision of relying on him/her 
is a rational choice taken with a clear degree of awareness. 
For migrants, indeed, smugglers constitute a valuable 
resource, the only escape from a situation of misery 
and extreme danger. In this sense, it is unsurprising 
that current restrictive immigration and asylum policy 
measures have not only had little deterrent effect, but also 
been counterproductive by redirecting immigrant flow 
through illegal channels.11 Picking the right smuggler may 
be fortuitous and migrant are certainly at the mercy of the 
smugglers during the journey to Europe. Yet, smuggling 
is a business, and like any other business it requires a 
certain level of trust.12 Smugglers depend in part on the 
former to find prospective “clients”. Successfully smuggled 
migrants, who survived the journey, can operate as a pull 
factor by tempting their kin and friends to embark in 
a similar journey. The words of Mohammed – a 
young man in his early mid-twenties from Syria, 
now an interpreter and social worker in Italy – are 
indicative of this awareness: “smugglers are neither 
good nor evil. You pay for a service and you get 
what you pay for”. Mohammed turned to smugglers 
when his family was refused a family reunification 
visa. He paid around 8000 euro to have his brother 
smuggled from Syria to Germany. It was a long and 
tiring journey and Mohammed’s brother crossed 
several states, via land and via sea. Yet, it was the 
only available way to Europe. 
11 See, for example, Carling, J., Hernandez-Carretero, M. 2011 “Protecting Europe and Protecting Migrants? Strategies 
for Managing Unauthorised Migration from Africa”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13, 42-58.
12 Triandafyllidou, A. 2015 (forthcoming), “Migrant Smuggling across the Mediterranean”. In Thiollet, T. Schmoll, C. 
Wihtol de Wenden, K. (eds) , Les Migrations en Mediterrannée, Paris, Editions CNRS.
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13 For comparative literature, see Lucht, H. 2012, Darkness before Daybreak: African Migrants Living on the Margins 
in Southern Italy Today, Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Mediterranean Politics, 12(2): 163-184,
Furthermore, migrants themselves, at times, get 
involved in the business. This overlapping of 
roles introduces a further layer of complexity 
by blurring the boundary between smugglers 
and their customers. Asylum seekers and labour 
migrants may work as either recruiters, passeurs, 
or intermediaries – positions that are often covered 
by the same person. They might escort immigrants 
across the border because of their own first-hand 
knowledge of the route. They might recruit clients 
for they share the same ethnic networks. They would 
provide the various services needed to the migrants 
(food, accommodation, etc.) because of their long-
term relationship with the local communities in the 
transit countries. They would do all this in order to 
pay the required fees, have a decent livelihood, or 
most likely accomplish both goals.13  A protracted 
condition of illegality is often the cause of this 
blurring of roles. The story of Firat is a case in point. 
The man – now in his late twenties – left Kurdish 
Iraq in 2010. In his long journey, he used different 
smuggling groups. He entered Italy from Greece, 
travelling hidden inside a truck that was embarked 
on a ferry. From there, he was transported to his 
final destination in the UK where he worked as a 
labourer in the informal economy. A few years after, 
however, the British authorities sent Firat back to 
Greece when they found him illegally residing 
in Britain. Stranded in Athens with no money, he 
took the decision to work as passeur for the same 
smugglers – people with whom he shared the same 
ethnic background – who had helped him crossing 
the Mediterranean. Firat is now split between 
continuing a lucrative, yet dangerous, job and 
embarking again in a long journey whose outcome 
is uncertain. 
Toward an effective response 
In light of the necessity of elaborating an adequate 
policy response to human smuggling, a better 
comprehension of the phenomenon is pivotal to 
ensuring the stability of the receiving state and the 
security of the migrant. Empirical evidence show that 
human smuggling across the Eastern Mediterranean 
sea is the sum of highly heterogeneous organizations 
operating on a small scale and in a short time-
frame; that these groups are characterized by 
the lack of solid hierarchies and the existence 
of interchangeable figures; that they provide a 
service that is in great demand without necessarily 
exploiting their clients; and that the smuggler and 
the costumer may, at times, be the same person. An 
effective eradication of these organizations without 
addressing the causes of clandestine migration 
may thus prove difficult for smuggling networks 
are deeply enmeshed within migratory flows. 
Nonetheless, EU efforts remain overwhelmingly 
focused on implementing a security-based policy. 
The creation of the European border agency Frontex 
in 2004 has been a clear step in this direction. The 
agency was set up “to reinforce and streamline 
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cooperation between national border authorities”.14 
To face the current crisis, the European Council 
has given more power to Frontex by pledging to 
triple the budget for its joint-operations Triton and 
Poseidon. As the European Agenda on Migration 
states, “this will expand both the capability and 
the geographical scope of these operations, so 
that Frontex can fulfil its dual role of coordinating 
operational border support to Member States under 
pressure, and helping to save the lives of migrants 
at sea”.15 Despite its important search-and-rescue 
dimension, however, this new agenda continues to 
be strongly centred on preventing illegal migration 
flows by fighting smuggling networks. In line with 
the mandate of Frontex, the accomplishment of 
search and rescue operations has been side-lined.16
Border controls play a crucial role in restraining 
human smuggling activities. That said, a number 
of undesired outcomes ultimately outweigh the 
intended goals of a security-oriented control policy.18 
First, sea border operations are often inefficient. 
The evolution of smuggling across the Eastern 
Mediterranean corridor demonstrates this with 
dramatic clarity. Not only has the large patrolled 
area hindered the extent of these operations and 
prompted spiralling financial costs. Effectively 
blocking smuggling networks only redirected 
unauthorized migration flows on different routes. 
In other words, if the stricter application of law 
enforcement by Italian authorities successfully 
cracked down the Albanian smuggling network, 
the Turkey-Greece corridor and the Libyan route 
became preferred alternatives (Figure 1). Second, 
the tightening of border control generally exposes 
migrants to greater dangers. As smugglers are 
themselves aware of moving on hazardous ground, 
they seek to limit the chances of apprehension by 
employing a variety of strategies – such as setting 
off on longer and therefore more dangerous 
journeys, choosing unsafe points of embarkation 
and disembarkation, adopting riskier manoeuvres 
to escape authorities, and abandoning their cargo 
on vessels in rough seas. It is not chance then that 
the risks of dying at sea are on the rise as fluxes are 
redirected along the more dangerous route via Libya 
(Figure 2). Even in the case of successfully preventing 
migrants leaving transit countries (such as Libya, 
Mauritania, or Morocco), we are left wondering 
whether this outcome would ultimately benefit 
them or aggravate their plight. Many accounts have 
reported how local authorities in these countries 
have arbitrary arrested, mistreated, and abused 
refugees and migrants.18 Third, the militarization 
of border control may ultimately trigger a vicious 
dynamic. Researchers have demonstrated that the 
increase in the effectiveness of control policies has 
accompanied a growing tendency of these groups to 
specialise and to increase their capacity of delivering 
specialized services to would-be migrants in a 
systematic and standardized manner.19 
14 FRONTEX, 2015, http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/, [Accessed: 1 June 2015].
15 European Commission, 2015, “Questions and answers on the European Agenda on Migration”, EU Press Release 
Database, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4957_en.htm [Accessed: 25 May 2015].16 Fabrice Leggeri, 
Executive Director of Frontex, note that Frontex “cannot have provisions for proactive search-and-rescue action. This is not 
in Frontex’s mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the European Union”. Http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/apr/22/eu-borders-chief-says-saving-migrants-lives-cannot-be-priority-for-patrols [Accessed: 25 May 2015].
17 Carling, J., Hernandez-Carretero, M. 2011 “Protecting Europe and Protecting Migrants?”.
18 Fargues, P. Di Bartolomeo, A. 2015, “Drowned Europe”.
19 See, amongst others, Monzini, P. 2007, “Sea-Border Crossings: The Organization of Irregular Migration to Italy” 
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Fig. 1: Sea routes to Europe 1990s-2014
Fig. 2: Dead and missing persons on maritime routes of irregular migration to the EU 1988-2015 (as of 19/04)
Source:Fargues, P. Bonfanti, S. 2014, “When the best option is a leaky boat”.
Source:Fargues, P. Di Bartolomeo, A. 2015, “Drowned Europe”.
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Does this mean that smugglers should be left 
undisturbed? Certainly not. However, the urgency 
of the sea crossing calls for a combination of policy 
measures. If the intended goal is the suppression 
of smuggling networks, security measures can be 
effective only if accompanied by other solutions. 
Moreover, the implementation of control and 
enforcement measures against smugglers should be 
carried out cautiously and should take into account 
the fragile political equilibrium that their enactment 
may help upset.20 The launch of search and rescue 
operations to assist migrants in immediate distress 
will certainly contribute to saving countless lives. 
These alone, however, are unlikely to curb smuggling 
activities: researches have shown, for example, how 
smugglers have exploited the presence of Italian 
vessels during the Operation Mare Nostrum by 
sending overcrowded boats off at sea, counting on 
the prompt response of the Italian fleet. A truly 
effective answer to human smuggling would require 
the EU and its state members to concentrate on 
reducing “demand” more than curbing “supply.” 
Smugglers often constitute the only available option 
for those migrants who flee a situation of immediate 
danger and distress. Accordingly, the first decisive 
step toward a more durable radical solution for the 
Tab. 1: Migrants smuggled at sea in Italy 2012-2015 (as of 20/04) by declared nationality Top ten nationalities
Nationality 2012 2013 2014 2015 (Jan 
1- Apr 20) 
Total
Syria 580 11,307 41,941 1,596 55,424
Eritrea 1,428 9,834 33,451 3,248 47,961
Somalia 2,179 3,263 5,644 2,566 13,652
Nigeria 358 2,680 8,570 1,991 13,599
Gambia 348 2,619 8,159 1,810 12,936
Mali 218 1,675 9,314 1,279 12,486
Egypt 1,221 2,728 4,091 47 8,087
Senegal 48 1,314 4,652 1,586 7,600
Palestine 37 1,075 6,024 384 7,520
Pakistan 1,238 1,753 3,678 513 7,182
Top ten nationali-
ties
7,655 38,248 125,524 15,020 186,447
Total nationalities 13,267 42,925 170,099 23,943 250,234
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior
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20 In a recent post, for example, Sergo Mananashvili points out how the EU’s planned anti-smuggling military opera-
tion in Libya called EUNAVFOR MED may seriously jeopardise any prospect of peace between the rival parties in Libya. See 
Mananashvili, S. 2015, “The Legal and Political Feasibility of the EU’s Planned ‘War on Smuggling’ in Libya”, http://www.
ejiltalk.org/the-legal-and-political-feasibility-of-the-eus-planned-war-on-smuggling-in-libya/ [Accessed: 16 June 2015].
21 As Fargues and Di Bartolomeo remark, “The vast majority of people smuggled by sea to Italy come from what we 
might call ‘refugee’ countries”.“Drowned Europe”, p. 5.
current crisis demands the opening of new channels 
of legal entry and the reinforcement of existing ones 
for refugees and asylum seekers, presumably the 
majority of people smuggled by sea (Table 1).21 This 
should translate into: granting humanitarian visas; 
the creation of humanitarian corridors between 
transit countries and Europe; the expansion of 
European countries’ resettlement programmes; 
and the development of alternative legal routes for 
refugees – such as family reunification, university 
fellowships and scholarships, training programmes, 
private sponsorships, and labour mobility. The 
sealing and fortification of the EU borderland will 
not only mean the neglect of asylum seekers, but 
it will also favour the consolidation of smuggling 
networks. Those who forecast the weakening of EU 
borders with the increase in migration-flows base 
their belief on the erroneous premise that a strong, 
functioning border can only limit trans-border flows. 
However, facilitating the entry of asylum seekers 
and opening our borders does not necessarily mean 
the demise of EU member states’ sovereign right to 
control population flows. If mobility and passages 
increase, so may the opportunities for the states 
to consolidate their sovereignty as incentives for 
regulation flourish.
Tab. 1: Migrants smuggled at sea in Italy 2012-2015 (as of 20/04) by declared nationality Top ten nationalities
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